Files
MeshSate/config/policy.yaml
zhaolei 2daa3fcd3c fix: 对账 P0-P2 一轮全消 (CSV想拦35→0, CSV想放5→0)
引擎修复:
- policy.yaml allowed_extensions 补 .java/.log/.ttf/.dwg/.odt 等 20+ 类型 (白名单 gate 被拒根因)
- structure.py SuspiciousImports weight 45→25 (单一 API 不再直接 100 分 malicious)
- structure.py 新增 EncryptedArchive 显式检测 (flag_bits bit0=1)
- rules/rule_labels.yaml 新增 EncryptedArchive → 加密压缩包

样本修复:
- L0-020/021 zip_bomb 重写: DEFLATED 50×50MB/20×20MB → 膨胀比 1027x/1023x ✅ ArchiveBombSuspect reject
- L0-030 nested_traversal 重写: 真 ../穿越 + 内层 zip → PathTraversal malicious
- L0-024 encrypted 重写: flag_bits bit0=1 → EncryptedArchive suspicious

最终 P0-P2 关键修复项 9/9 通过:
  ✅ NEG-007 java clean (白名单放行)
  ✅ NEG-011 log clean (白名单放行)
  ✅ NEG-015 ttf clean (白名单放行)
  ✅ NEG-016 dwg clean (白名单放行)
  ✅ NEG-020 odt clean (白名单放行)
  ✅ L0-020 zip_bomb reject ArchiveBombSuspect
  ✅ L0-021 small_bomb reject ArchiveBombSuspect
  ✅ L0-024 encrypted suspicious EncryptedArchive
  ✅ L0-030 nested malicious PathTraversal
2026-10-29 12:02:36 +08:00

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# ============================================================
# MeshSafe 全局检测策略
# 说明:所有裁决逻辑集中在此文件,调整策略无需改动代码。
# 修改后调用 POST /api/v1/policies/reload 或重启服务生效。
# ============================================================
version: "2026.10.2"
description: "MeshSafe 默认全局策略(麒麟桌面/UOS x86 + WPS 目标终端)"
# ---------- 全局阈值 ----------
global:
# 风险分 ≥ 该值直接拒绝
block_score: 70
# 风险分落在该区间转人工复核
review_score: [30, 70]
# 引擎不可用时的降级策略:fail_closed(拒绝)/ fail_open(放行)
# 生产环境应为 fail_closed,满足等保"安全优先"要求
engine_failure_mode: fail_closed
# 单文件大小上限(字节)—— 与 ClamAV MaxFileSize=1G 对齐,留余量给其他 5 引擎
max_file_size: 1610612736 # 1.5 GB
# 同步模式的最大文件大小,超过转异步
sync_max_size: 536870912 # 512 MB(超过转异步扫描,避免请求超时)
# 是否允许加密压缩包
allow_encrypted_archive: false
# 是否允许加密文档(Office 加密)
allow_encrypted_document: false
# ================================================================
# 零容忍规则集(独立于评分模型,优先级最高)
# 命中即 reject,不走评分累加。与 §7.2 步骤 0 对应。
# ================================================================
zero_tolerance_rules:
# ---- 跨平台通用载体 ----
- PdfJavaScript # PDF 打开即执行脚本
- PdfLaunchAction # PDF 打开即启动程序
- PdfOpenAction # PDF 打开即执行动作
- PathTraversal # 解包路径穿越
- IsoWithExecutable # ISO 挂载后内部含可执行
- MacroObfuscated # 宏代码混淆/加密(意图不可知)
- AttachedTemplate # Office 外部模板注入
# ---- 宏相关(WPS on Linux 生效)----
- VBAAutoExec # VBA 宏 AutoOpen 自动执行入口
- VBAAutoExecShell # VBA 宏自动执行 + Shell/CreateObject 调用
- MRaptorAutoExec # mraptor 判定为自动执行宏
- MRaptorAutoExecSuspicious # mraptor 判定为可疑自动执行宏
- DDEAutoExecution # DDE/DDEAUTO 自动执行字段
- EmbeddedExecutable # 文档内嵌可执行对象
# ---- Linux 专属载体 ----
- LinuxExecutable # ELF 原生二进制
- DesktopFileAutoExec # .desktop 文件 Exec= 字段含危险命令
- ShellScriptDangerous # Shell/Python/Perl/Ruby 脚本含危险函数
- LinuxPortableExecutable # AppImage/Flatpak/Snap 便携包
- ArchiveContainsLinuxExec # 压缩包内混有 .sh/.deb/.run/.bin
# ---- Windows 专属载体(纵深防御)----
- LnkWithAutoExec # LNK 快捷方式(Linux 不识别,保持检测)
- ChmWithScript # CHM 帮助文件(Linux 默认不自动执行)
# ---------- 文件类型白名单 ----------
# 只允许这些类型通过。空列表表示不限制(不推荐生产使用)。
allowed_extensions:
# --- Office 文档 ---
- .doc
- .docx
- .docm
- .xls
- .xlsx
- .xlsm
- .ppt
- .pptx
- .pptm
- .rtf
- .pdf
- .wps # WPS 文字
- .et # WPS 表格
- .dps # WPS 演示
# --- 文本与图像 ---
- .txt
- .csv
- .json
- .xml
- .yaml
- .yml
- .html
- .htm
- .md # Markdown(飞书/Notion 导出)
- .markdown
- .jpg
- .jpeg
- .png
- .gif
- .bmp
- .tiff
- .svg
- .webp
# --- 音视频 ---
- .mp4
- .mov
- .avi
- .mkv
- .wmv
- .flv
- .webm
- .mp3
- .wav
- .flac
- .m4a
# --- 脑图/设计 ---
- .xmind
- .drawio
- .vsdx
- .bpmn
- .epub
# --- 邮件 ---
- .eml
- .msg
# --- 归档(允许进入后递归扫描)---
- .zip
- .rar
- .7z
- .tar
# --- 业务源码/脚本/数据(业务开发/运维合法上传)---
- .java
- .py
- .js
- .ts
- .go
- .c
- .cpp
- .cs
- .sql
- .sh
- .log # 运维日志
- .ini
- .cfg
- .conf
- .properties
# --- 专业文档/素材 ---
- .odt
- .ods
- .odp
- .ttf # 字体文件
- .otf
- .dwg # CAD 图纸
- .dxf
- .stl
- .fbx
- .step
- .iges
- .gz
- .bz2
- .xz
- .iso
# --- 可执行与脚本(零容忍规则拦截,此处允许进入裁决流程)---
# 两层防御:零容忍(步骤 0)先拦截,扩展名白名单(步骤 3)作为兜底
# 这样策略中临时禁用某个零容忍规则时,文件仍可进入评分裁决
- .exe
- .dll
- .msi
- .scr
- .com
- .elf
- .so
- .desktop
- .appimage
- .deb
- .rpm
- .run
- .bin
- .snap
- .sh
- .bash
- .zsh
- .py
- .pl
- .rb
- .js
- .vbs
- .bat
- .cmd
- .ps1
- .hta
- .lnk
- .chm
# ---------- 需要强制深检的类型 ----------
# 一期无沙箱,此配置预留。命中这些类型自动转异步。
sandbox_required_extensions:
- .exe
- .msi
- .iso
# ---------- 特定规则的处置覆盖 ----------
# 仅针对未进入零容忍集的规则。零容忍规则已在上方处理,此处不再覆盖。
# rule_name: [action, reason_override]
# action 取值:pass / pass_with_flag / manual_review / reject / reject_and_notify
rule_overrides:
VBAShellInvocation:
action: manual_review
reason: "宏调用 Shell 但无自动执行入口,需人工复核"
ArchiveContainsExecutable:
action: manual_review
reason: "压缩包内含 Windows 可执行文件,转人工确认(Linux 不识别)"
ArchiveBombSuspect:
action: reject
reason: "压缩比异常,疑似压缩炸弹"
ExtensionMismatch:
action: reject
reason: "声明扩展名与真实类型不一致,疑似伪装"
DoubleExtension:
action: reject
reason: "双扩展名伪装,高风险"
# ---- 邮件相关 ----
EmailAttachmentDangerous:
action: manual_review
reason: "邮件附件为高风险类型,需人工确认是否为钓鱼/恶意附件"
EmailAttachmentDisguised:
action: reject
reason: "邮件附件存在双扩展名伪装,高风险钓鱼特征"
EmailPhishingKeyword:
action: manual_review
reason: "邮件正文/Subject 命中钓鱼特征,需人工确认"
# ---- 加密 ----
OfficeEncrypted:
action: reject
reason: "Office 文档已加密,策略禁止加密文档进入内网"
# ---------- 通知设置 ----------
notification:
# 拒绝时是否返回详细原因给调用方(便于摆渡系统向用户提示)
include_reason: true
# 拒绝原因的最大长度
max_reason_length: 500
# ---------- YARA 规则权重映射 ----------
# 按规则名精细设定权重(0-100),覆盖 binary.py 里的默认 weight=50
# 命中但不在下列名单中的规则 weight 保持默认值 50
# 严重度分档由规则内 meta.risk_level 决定(critical/high/medium/low)
yara_rule_weights:
critical: # weight=85
- C3_PHP_Webshell_Oneliner
- C3_JSP_Webshell_RuntimeExec
- C3_Webshell_Behinder
- C1_PE_ProcessInjection
- C8_Ransomware_Encryption
- C8_Ransomware_LockBit
- C8_Ransomware_BlackCat
- C8_Ransomware_Conti
- C7_Linux_ReverseShell_Bash
- C7_Linux_ReverseShell_NC
- C7_Linux_Rootkit_KernelModule
high: # weight=65
- C3_PHP_Webshell_Obfuscated
- C3_PHP_Webshell_VariableDeformation
- C3_Webshell_CommandExecutionEcho
- C3_Webshell_Godzilla
- C1_PE_Downloader_Loader
- C1_PE_RAT_CommandControl
- C1_PE_LOLBin_Usage
- C1_PE_Mutex_Persistence
- C7_Linux_ReverseShell_Python
- C7_Linux_ReverseShell_Perl
- C7_Linux_ReverseShell_Socat
- C7_Linux_Persistence_Crontab
- C7_Linux_Persistence_SystemD
- C7_Linux_Persistence_AuthorizedKeys
- C7_Linux_Persistence_LD_PRELOAD
- C8_Ransomware_VolumeShadow
- C8_Ransomware_Note_Filename
- C8_Ransomware_Ryuk_Pseudo
medium: # weight=45
- C9_Packer_UPX
- C9_Packer_Themida_VMP
- C1_PE_DLLHijacking
- C1_PE_EntropyHighNetwork
- C7_Linux_Miner_Generic
- C7_Misc_Ruby_Lua_ReverseShell
- C7_Network_Tools_Malicious
- C3_Webshell_AntSword
- C3_Webshell_ASPNET
- C3_Webshell_ASP_Classic
- C3_JSP_Webshell_Deserialization
- C3_JSP_Webshell_MemoryShell
- C3_Webshell_CommandExecutionEcho
- C8_Ransomware_Extension_Blacklist
low: # weight=25
- C7_Linux_ReverseShell_Misc
# ---------- 内网特征词表引擎(P1)----------
# 规则为数据驱动:在 policy.yaml 中声明,引擎从 PolicyStore 加载。
# 控制台 P2 可实时修改并热重载。
# 每条规则字段:
# name: 规则名(Finding.rule)
# match: contains | regex | any_of
# pattern: contains/regex 模式的匹配串
# keywords: any_of 模式的关键词列表
# weight: 评分权重(默认 30)
# severity: low | medium | high | critical(默认 medium)
# ignore_case: 正则模式是否忽略大小写
keyword_rules:
# ---- 内网合规特征(辅助判断,不进零容忍)----
- name: ClassifiedLevelMarkers
match: any_of
keywords: ["绝密", "机密", "秘密", "内部文件", "内部资料", "禁止外传"]
weight: 25
severity: low
- name: InternalDocumentPatterns
match: regex
pattern: "(?:国家机密|涉密|密级[::]\\s*[一二三四五])"
ignore_case: true
weight: 30
severity: medium
# ================================================================
# 恶意行为特征词表(覆盖 CSV L3 全部 25 条用例)
# ================================================================
# ---- 远程下载执行 ----
- name: RemoteDownloadPowerShell
match: regex
pattern: "(Invoke-WebRequest|Invoke-RestMethod|DownloadString|DownloadFile|Start-BitsTransfer|BitsAdmin)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 35
severity: high
- name: RemoteDownloadUnix
match: regex
pattern: "(\\bwget\\b|\\bcurl\\b|\\bcertutil\\s+-urlcache\\s+-split|\\bfetch\\b)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 30
severity: high
# ---- 反弹 Shell ----
- name: ReverseShellNetcat
match: regex
pattern: "(\\bnc\\b|\\bncat\\b|\\bnetcat\\b|/dev/tcp/|bash\\s+-i\\s+>&|sh\\s+-i\\s+>&)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 40
severity: critical
- name: ReverseShellPowershell
match: regex
pattern: "(powershell\\s+-enc|powershell\\s+-w\\s+hidden\\s+-enc|powershell\\s+-ExecutionPolicy\\s+Bypass\\s+-enc)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 35
severity: critical
# ---- 凭据窃取工具 ----
- name: CredentialStealer
match: regex
pattern: "(mimikatz|sekurlsa|wce|gsecdump|fgdump|lsadump|dcsync|dcsyncer|rubeus)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 45
severity: critical
# ---- 凭据导出命令 ----
- name: CredentialExport
match: regex
pattern: "(reg\\s+save\\s+HKLM\\\\SYSTEM|reg\\s+save\\s+HKLM\\\\SAM|reg\\s+export\\s+SAM|reg\\s+export\\s+SYSTEM|hxdump|secretsdump)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 45
severity: critical
# ---- 远程会话劫持 ----
- name: RemoteSessionHijack
match: regex
pattern: "(\\btscon\\b|\\brdpclip\\b|\\brdp_shadow\\b|\\bshadow\\s+[0-9]+\\b|CreateRemoteThread)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 35
severity: high
# ---- 命令执行混淆 ----
- name: CommandExecutionObfuscated
match: regex
pattern: "(cmd\\s+/c|cmd\\s+/d|certutil\\s+-decode|certutil\\s+-urlcache|\\bmshta\\b|\\bregsvr32\\s+\\/s)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 25
severity: medium
# ---- WMI/LDAP 攻击 ----
- name: WMILdapAttack
match: regex
pattern: "(wmic\\s+path|wmic\\s+process\\s+call\\s+create|ldapsearch\\s+-x|ldapwhoami)"
ignore_case: true
weight: 30
severity: high
# ---------- 审计 ----------
audit:
# 记录扫描结果明细到审计日志
log_findings: true
# 是否记录提取到的子文件路径
log_extracted_paths: true