zhaolei
b6a004bdb7
检测范围与证据链修复，不改裁决口径（口径改动在下一条提交）。 - extractor：zip/tar 成员在超限分支外漏加回扫描队列，解包后内容永远不参与检测； zip 目录条目被当成内嵌对象；tar 超限成员先落盘不删。递归真正生效后深扫耗时可测。 - clamav：_HIGH/_MEDIUM/_UNWANTED 关键词是小写，而签名名是 "Win.Trojan..." 大小写混排， 分级判定恒不命中全走默认档；改统一大写匹配。超过 clamd MaxFileSize 的裸奔区间 (1G~1.5G) 新增 ClamAVSkippedSizeLimit(30) — 按"不可扫描不放行"进复核。 - yara：pe.yar C1 系列改用导入表判定，不再靠裸子串命中字符串表； linux.yar C7 多条规则条件恒真（裸 nc/fetch 之类）已收紧；C8/C3 相应收窄。 - structure：DangerousExecutableExtension 是载体信号而非恶意行为，critical 权重 45→35， 不再作为把中低置信度信号一起顶过 block_score 的底座。 - scanner/documents：real_type 拼进 libmagic 对 MSI/OLE 的元数据串实测 334+ 字符， 超列宽导致整条 scan_tasks INSERT 连 findings 一起丢（被拒文件不留痕）→ 列宽 256→512，migrate.sql 补 ALTER。
608 lines
24 KiB
Python
608 lines
24 KiB
Python
"""L2b YARA 规则与二进制分析引擎。
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包含：
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- YARA 规则匹配（规则库从 ``rules/`` 目录加载，支持热加载）
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- PE 文件结构分析（pefile）：节区异常、导入表、编译信息、签名
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- 可执行文件能力识别（capa，若已安装）
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import threading
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from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
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from app.engines.base import Engine, EngineResult, Finding, ScanTarget, Severity
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BINARY_EXTS = {".exe", ".dll", ".sys", ".scr", ".com", ".cpl", ".ocx", ".msi", ".apk", ".jar", ".so", ".bin", ".elf"}
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# ---------- pefile 失败时的手工 PE 分析 fallback ----------
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# PE Section Characteristics 常量（与 pefile.SECTION_CHARACTERISTICS 一致）
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_PE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE = 0x20000000
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_PE_SCN_MEM_WRITE = 0x80000000
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# 声明扩展名 → 该格式自己的魔数。这些容器本就不是 PE，用 pefile 解析必然抛错；
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# 把"格式完全正常的安装包/共享库"记成 PeParseFailed 会给每个 .msi/.jar/.so 白送 10 分。
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_NATIVE_MAGIC: Dict[str, Any] = {
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".msi": (b"\xd0\xcf\x11\xe0",),
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".msp": (b"\xd0\xcf\x11\xe0",),
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".mst": (b"\xd0\xcf\x11\xe0",),
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".jar": (b"PK\x03\x04", b"PK\x05\x06"),
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".war": (b"PK\x03\x04", b"PK\x05\x06"),
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".apk": (b"PK\x03\x04", b"PK\x05\x06"),
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".so": (b"\x7fELF",),
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".elf": (b"\x7fELF",),
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}
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def _is_native_container(path: str, ext: str) -> bool:
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"""文件内容是否就是其声明格式（非 PE）。"""
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expected = _NATIVE_MAGIC.get(ext)
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if not expected:
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return False
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try:
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with open(path, "rb") as fh:
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head = fh.read(4)
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except OSError:
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return False
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return any(head.startswith(m) for m in expected)
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def _manual_pe_analysis(path: str) -> List[Finding]:
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"""pefile 解析失败时，手工搜索 PE\\0\\0 签名并解析节表。
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覆盖场景：假 PE / 伪装 PE / e_lfanew 偏移错误。pefile 严格校验
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e_lfanew 指向的签名是否为 PE\\0\\0，但攻击者可以让 e_lfanew 偏移
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错几个字节让 pefile 报错，同时文件里仍有真实的 PE\\0\\0 和节表。
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"""
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import struct
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findings: List[Finding] = []
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try:
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with open(path, "rb") as fh:
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data = fh.read()
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except OSError:
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return findings
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# 1) MZ 头存在？（PE 文件必需）
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if len(data) < 2 or data[:2] != b"MZ":
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return findings # 根本不是 PE
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# 2) 尝试从 e_lfanew 取 PE 偏移；不对就全局搜索 PE\0\0
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pe_off = -1
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if len(data) >= 0x40:
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try:
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e_lfanew = struct.unpack_from("<I", data, 0x3C)[0]
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if e_lfanew + 4 <= len(data) and data[e_lfanew:e_lfanew + 4] == b"PE\x00\x00":
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pe_off = e_lfanew
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except struct.error:
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pass
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if pe_off < 0:
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pe_off = data.find(b"PE\x00\x00")
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if pe_off < 0:
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return findings # 没找到 PE 签名
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# 3) COFF header 在 PE\0\0 后 4 字节
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coff_off = pe_off + 4
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if coff_off + 24 > len(data):
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return findings
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num_sections = struct.unpack_from("<H", data, coff_off + 2)[0]
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size_opt_header = struct.unpack_from("<H", data, coff_off + 16)[0]
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section_table_off = coff_off + 20 + size_opt_header
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if num_sections == 0 or num_sections > 96: # 合理上限
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return findings
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if section_table_off + num_sections * 40 > len(data):
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return findings
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# 4) 逐节扫描 RWX 属性
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rwx_sections = []
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for i in range(num_sections):
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sec_off = section_table_off + i * 40
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name = data[sec_off:sec_off + 8].rstrip(b"\x00")
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characteristics = struct.unpack_from("<I", data, sec_off + 36)[0]
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if (characteristics & _PE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE) and (characteristics & _PE_SCN_MEM_WRITE):
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rwx_sections.append(name.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
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if rwx_sections:
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine="binary", layer="L2B",
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severity=Severity.HIGH.value, rule="RWXSectionDetected",
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detail=f"手工 PE 分析检测到可写且可执行的危险节：{', '.join(rwx_sections)}",
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weight=50.0,
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)
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)
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return findings
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# ---------- 模块级全局 YARA 规则单例 ----------
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# 所有 YaraEngine 实例共享同一个编译结果，避免重复 compile
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# rules_dir 不同时（极少见）才分叉加载
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_YARA_GLOBAL: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
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_YARA_LOCK = threading.Lock()
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def _get_global_yara(rules_dir: str) -> Optional[Any]:
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"""获取全局共享的 YARA Rules 对象（自动按目录 mtime 重载）。"""
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with _YARA_LOCK:
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cached = _YARA_GLOBAL.get(rules_dir)
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import yara as _yr
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newest = 0.0
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files: List[str] = []
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if os.path.isdir(rules_dir):
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for name in sorted(os.listdir(rules_dir)):
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if name.endswith((".yar", ".yara")):
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path = os.path.join(rules_dir, name)
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files.append(path)
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newest = max(newest, os.path.getmtime(path))
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if cached and cached.get("mtime") == newest:
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return cached.get("rules")
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if not files:
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_YARA_GLOBAL[rules_dir] = {"rules": None, "mtime": newest}
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return None
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try:
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compiled = _yr.compile(filepaths={os.path.basename(p): p for p in files})
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except Exception:
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_YARA_GLOBAL[rules_dir] = {"rules": None, "mtime": newest}
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return None
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_YARA_GLOBAL[rules_dir] = {"rules": compiled, "mtime": newest}
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return compiled
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def _discover_rules_dir() -> str:
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"""自动探测 YARA 规则目录（优先环境变量 > /app/rules > 项目根 rules/）。"""
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env_dir = os.environ.get("MESHSAFE_RULES_DIR", "").strip()
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if env_dir and os.path.isdir(env_dir):
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return env_dir
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for candidate in ("/app/rules", "rules", "./rules", "../rules"):
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if os.path.isdir(candidate):
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return os.path.abspath(candidate)
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return env_dir or "/app/rules"
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class YaraEngine(Engine):
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"""YARA 规则匹配引擎（使用全局共享的编译结果）。"""
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name = "yara"
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layer = "L2B"
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def __init__(self, rules_dir: str | None = None) -> None:
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# 显式传入时才用传入值，否则走自动探测
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self.rules_dir = rules_dir if rules_dir else _discover_rules_dir()
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def _load_rules(self) -> Any:
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"""委托给全局单例。"""
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try:
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import yara # noqa: F401 — 只是探测可用性
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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return None
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return _get_global_yara(self.rules_dir)
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def scan(self, target: ScanTarget, ctx: Any) -> EngineResult:
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result = EngineResult(engine=self.name)
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rules = self._load_rules()
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if rules is None:
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result.ok = False
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result.error = "YARA 规则库不可用或编译失败"
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return result
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try:
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# 本环境的 yara-python 4.5.4 在 Match 对象上默认就带 meta，
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# 且 rules.match() 不接受 with_meta 关键字（传了会整引擎报错）。
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matches = rules.match(target.path)
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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result.ok = False
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result.error = f"YARA 匹配失败：{exc}"
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return result
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for match in matches:
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meta = getattr(match, "meta", None) or {}
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severity, weight = _judge_yara_rule(match.rule, match.tags, meta)
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# 覆盖：如果 ctx 里的策略为该 YARA 规则定义了精细权重，用它
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try:
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policy = ctx.policy_engine.policy
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yara_weights = getattr(policy, "yara_weights", {}) or {}
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if match.rule in yara_weights:
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weight = float(yara_weights[match.rule])
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except Exception:
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pass # ctx 没有 policy 字段时保持默认 weight
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desc = str(meta.get("description", "")).strip()
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tags_text = ", ".join(match.tags)
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result.findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=severity,
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rule=match.rule,
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detail=(
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f"YARA 规则 {match.rule} 命中"
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+ (f"（{desc}）" if desc else f"（标签：{tags_text or '无'}）")
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),
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weight=weight,
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meta={"tags": list(match.tags)},
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)
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)
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# rule_set_version 用全局 compiled 对象的 id（每次 reload 变）
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try:
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_r = _get_global_yara(self.rules_dir)
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result.meta["rule_set_version"] = str(id(_r)) if _r else "unavailable"
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except Exception:
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result.meta["rule_set_version"] = "unknown"
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return result
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def health(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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rules = self._load_rules()
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ok = rules is not None
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return {
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"engine": self.name,
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"version": "rules" if ok else "none",
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"ok": ok,
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"status": "ok" if ok else "degraded",
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"error": None if ok else "YARA 规则库未加载",
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"info": f"rules_dir={self.rules_dir}" if not ok else "rules loaded",
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}
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class BinaryEngine(Engine):
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"""PE/二进制文件结构分析引擎。"""
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name = "binary"
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layer = "L2B"
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def scan(self, target: ScanTarget, ctx: Any) -> EngineResult:
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result = EngineResult(engine=self.name)
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ext = (target.declared_ext or "").lower()
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if ext not in BINARY_EXTS:
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return result
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# 内容确实是声明的那个非 PE 容器（MSI=CFB、JAR/APK=ZIP、SO/ELF=ELF）→ 不做 PE 分析
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if _is_native_container(target.path, ext):
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return result
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try:
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import pefile
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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result.ok = False
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result.error = "pefile 未安装"
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return result
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try:
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pe = pefile.PE(target.path, fast_load=False)
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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result.findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.MEDIUM.value,
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rule="PeParseFailed",
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detail=f"PE 结构解析失败：{exc}",
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weight=10.0,
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)
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)
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# --- pefile 失败时尝试手工 PE 分析（覆盖假 PE / 伪装 PE）---
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manual = _manual_pe_analysis(target.path)
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if manual:
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result.findings.extend(manual)
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return result
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try:
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result.findings.extend(self._analyze(pe, target))
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finally:
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try:
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pe.close()
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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pass
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return result
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def _analyze(self, pe: Any, target: ScanTarget) -> List[Finding]:
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findings: List[Finding] = []
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# 1) 节区熵值：加密/加壳的节区熵接近 8
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for section in getattr(pe, "sections", []) or []:
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try:
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name = section.Name.rstrip(b"\x00").decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
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entropy = section.get_entropy()
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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continue
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if entropy >= 7.2:
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.MEDIUM.value,
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rule="HighEntropySection",
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detail=f"节区 {name} 熵值 {entropy:.2f}，可能经过加密或加壳",
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weight=20.0,
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)
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)
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# 2) 导入表能力信号：只做佐证，不做独立定罪
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# Windows 自身的内核/外壳组件（kernel32、shell32、wer）必然导入
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# VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory 这类 API——它们就是这些 API 的实现方。
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# 真正的注入判定由 YARA C1_PE_ProcessInjection（导入名邻接窗口）负责，
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# 这里按「命中个数」而不是「命中即高危」计分，避免正常软件被判恶意。
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tier1, tier2, tier3 = self._suspicious_imports(pe)
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if len(tier1) >= 2:
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.HIGH.value,
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rule="SuspiciousImports",
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detail=f"导入表同时包含多个注入/后门级 API：{', '.join(tier1[:8])}",
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weight=20.0,
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)
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)
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elif len(tier1) == 1:
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.LOW.value,
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rule="SuspiciousImports",
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detail=f"导入表含单个注入/后门级 API（系统组件常态，需其他信号佐证）：{tier1[0]}",
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weight=5.0,
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)
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)
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if len(tier2) >= 3:
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.LOW.value,
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rule="CapabilityImports",
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detail=f"导入表同时具备多项危险能力：{', '.join(tier2[:8])}",
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weight=10.0,
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)
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)
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elif tier3:
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.INFO.value,
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rule="AntiDebugImports",
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detail=f"导入表含反调试/环境探测 API（正常软件普遍使用）：{', '.join(tier3[:8])}",
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weight=0.0,
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)
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)
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# 3) 无签名可执行文件
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if not self._has_signature(pe):
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.MEDIUM.value,
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rule="UnsignedExecutable",
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detail="可执行文件未携带数字签名（内网自研工具常态，仅辅助人工判断）",
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weight=10.0,
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)
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)
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# 4) 编译时间戳异常（明显晚于其他节区时间，或为 1970/未来时间）
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timestamp = getattr(pe, "FILE_HEADER", None)
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if timestamp is not None:
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try:
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ts = int(timestamp.TimeDateStamp)
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if ts == 0 or ts > 4102444800: # 2100 年之后
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findings.append(
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Finding(
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engine=self.name,
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layer=self.layer,
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severity=Severity.LOW.value,
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rule="SuspiciousTimestamp",
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detail="PE 编译时间戳异常，可能被伪造",
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weight=0.0,
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)
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)
|
||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||
pass
|
||
|
||
# 5) UPX 壳显式检测 —— 检查节名 UPX0 / UPX1 / UPX!
|
||
upx_sections = []
|
||
for section in getattr(pe, "sections", []) or []:
|
||
try:
|
||
name = section.Name.rstrip(b"\x00").decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||
if name.upper().startswith("UPX"):
|
||
upx_sections.append(name)
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
continue
|
||
if upx_sections:
|
||
findings.append(
|
||
Finding(
|
||
engine=self.name,
|
||
layer=self.layer,
|
||
severity=Severity.MEDIUM.value,
|
||
rule="UPXPackerDetected",
|
||
detail=f"检测到 UPX 加壳节：{', '.join(upx_sections)}",
|
||
weight=30.0,
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 6) RWX 可写可执行节 —— 高危（绕过 DEP 的典型手法）
|
||
from pefile import SECTION_CHARACTERISTICS # noqa: PLC0415
|
||
MEM_EXECUTE = SECTION_CHARACTERISTICS["IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE"]
|
||
MEM_WRITE = SECTION_CHARACTERISTICS["IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE"]
|
||
rwx_sections = []
|
||
for section in getattr(pe, "sections", []) or []:
|
||
try:
|
||
flags = section.Characteristics
|
||
if (flags & MEM_EXECUTE) and (flags & MEM_WRITE):
|
||
name = section.Name.rstrip(b"\x00").decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||
rwx_sections.append(name)
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
continue
|
||
if rwx_sections:
|
||
findings.append(
|
||
Finding(
|
||
engine=self.name,
|
||
layer=self.layer,
|
||
severity=Severity.HIGH.value,
|
||
rule="RWXSectionDetected",
|
||
detail=f"检测到可写且可执行的危险节：{', '.join(rwx_sections)}",
|
||
weight=40.0,
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 7) 32/64 位识别（info 级别，辅助判断）
|
||
machine = None
|
||
pe32 = None
|
||
try:
|
||
machine = int(pe.FILE_HEADER.Machine)
|
||
pe32 = (pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.Magic == 0x10B) # PE32
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
pass
|
||
if machine is not None:
|
||
try:
|
||
from pefile import MACHINE_TYPES # noqa: PLC0415
|
||
machine_name = MACHINE_TYPES.get(machine, f"UNKNOWN(0x{machine:04x})")
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
machine_name = f"0x{machine:04x}"
|
||
bits = "32-bit" if pe32 else "64-bit"
|
||
findings.append(
|
||
Finding(
|
||
engine=self.name,
|
||
layer=self.layer,
|
||
severity=Severity.LOW.value,
|
||
rule="PEArchInfo",
|
||
detail=f"PE 架构：{machine_name} / {bits}",
|
||
weight=0.0,
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 8) 调试信息（pdb 路径或 debug 节）
|
||
has_debug_dir = False
|
||
has_debug_section = False
|
||
try:
|
||
debug_dir = pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.DATA_DIRECTORY[6] # IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG
|
||
if debug_dir.VirtualAddress and debug_dir.Size:
|
||
has_debug_dir = True
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
pass
|
||
for section in getattr(pe, "sections", []) or []:
|
||
try:
|
||
name = section.Name.rstrip(b"\x00").decode("utf-8", errors="replace").lower()
|
||
if ".debug" in name or name.startswith("debug") or name.startswith(".pdb"):
|
||
has_debug_section = True
|
||
break
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
continue
|
||
if has_debug_dir or has_debug_section:
|
||
findings.append(
|
||
Finding(
|
||
engine=self.name,
|
||
layer=self.layer,
|
||
severity=Severity.LOW.value,
|
||
rule="DebugInformationPresent",
|
||
detail="PE 包含调试信息（PDB 路径或 .debug 节），可用于逆向定位",
|
||
weight=0.0,
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
return findings
|
||
|
||
def _suspicious_imports(self, pe: Any) -> "tuple[List[str], List[str], List[str]]":
|
||
"""导入 API 按恶意指向分档。
|
||
|
||
返回 (tier1, tier2, tier3)：
|
||
tier1 注入/后门级 API —— 单独出现即可疑
|
||
tier2 危险能力 API —— 正常软件也常用，需多项共存才计分
|
||
tier3 反调试/探测 API —— 信息项，不计分（大量合法商业软件带加壳自保会用）
|
||
"""
|
||
tier1_set = {
|
||
"VirtualAllocEx", "WriteProcessMemory", "CreateRemoteThread",
|
||
"NtUnmapViewOfSection", "SetWindowsHookEx", "SetWindowsHookExA",
|
||
"SetWindowsHookExW", "URLDownloadToFileA", "URLDownloadToFileW",
|
||
"QueueUserAPC", "NtQueueApcThread", "RtlCreateUserThread",
|
||
}
|
||
tier2_set = {
|
||
"OpenProcess", "WinHttpOpen", "WinHttpOpenRequest", "WinHttpSendRequest",
|
||
"CryptEncrypt", "CryptDeriveKey", "AdjustTokenPrivileges",
|
||
"LookupPrivilegeValueA", "LookupPrivilegeValueW", "OpenProcessToken",
|
||
"VirtualProtectEx", "ReadProcessMemory", "SuspendThread", "GetAsyncKeyState",
|
||
"SetWinEventHook", "HttpSendRequestA", "InternetWriteFile",
|
||
"RegSetValueExA", "RegSetValueExW",
|
||
# 以下 API 恶意软件常用，但任何"要装服务/要启动进程/要联网"的正常
|
||
# 软件都必然导入它们，不足以单独定罪
|
||
"WinExec", "ShellExecuteExA", "ShellExecuteExW", "CreateServiceA",
|
||
"CreateServiceW", "InternetOpenUrlA", "InternetOpenUrlW",
|
||
"CreateNamedPipeA", "DefineDosDeviceW",
|
||
}
|
||
tier3_set = {
|
||
"IsDebuggerPresent", "CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent", "OutputDebugStringA",
|
||
"GetTickCount", "GetTickCount64", "QueryPerformanceCounter",
|
||
"GetProcessHeap", "FindWindowA", "FindWindowW",
|
||
}
|
||
found1: List[str] = []
|
||
found2: List[str] = []
|
||
found3: List[str] = []
|
||
try:
|
||
for entry in getattr(pe, "DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT", []) or []:
|
||
for imp in entry.imports:
|
||
if not imp.name:
|
||
continue
|
||
name = imp.name.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||
if name in tier1_set:
|
||
found1.append(name)
|
||
elif name in tier2_set:
|
||
found2.append(name)
|
||
elif name in tier3_set:
|
||
found3.append(name)
|
||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||
pass
|
||
return sorted(set(found1)), sorted(set(found2)), sorted(set(found3))
|
||
|
||
def _has_signature(self, pe: Any) -> bool:
|
||
"""检查 PE 是否包含 Authenticode 签名目录。"""
|
||
try:
|
||
directory = pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.DATA_DIRECTORY[4] # IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
|
||
return bool(directory.VirtualAddress and directory.Size)
|
||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
|
||
_YARA_RISK_SEVERITY = {
|
||
"critical": Severity.CRITICAL.value,
|
||
"high": Severity.HIGH.value,
|
||
"medium": Severity.MEDIUM.value,
|
||
"low": Severity.LOW.value,
|
||
}
|
||
_YARA_RISK_WEIGHT = {"critical": 85.0, "high": 60.0, "medium": 30.0, "low": 10.0}
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _judge_yara_rule(rule: str, tags: List[str], meta: Dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> tuple[str, float]:
|
||
"""依据规则 meta.risk_level 判定严重度（其次才是标签/规则名启发式）。
|
||
|
||
v0.2.3 只看标签与规则名，规则库里的 risk_level 被完全忽略，
|
||
结果 65 分的 C1_PE_RAT 显示成"低危"，权重与严重度两套口径。
|
||
"""
|
||
risk = str((meta or {}).get("risk_level", "")).strip().lower()
|
||
if risk in _YARA_RISK_SEVERITY:
|
||
return _YARA_RISK_SEVERITY[risk], _YARA_RISK_WEIGHT[risk]
|
||
|
||
tag_set = {t.lower() for t in tags}
|
||
text = f"{rule} {' '.join(tags)}".lower()
|
||
|
||
if "critical" in tag_set or any(k in text for k in ("malware", "ransomware", "backdoor", "c2", "exploit")):
|
||
return Severity.CRITICAL.value, 85.0
|
||
if "high" in tag_set or any(k in text for k in ("trojan", "dropper", "obfusc", "shellcode")):
|
||
return Severity.HIGH.value, 60.0
|
||
if "medium" in tag_set or any(k in text for k in ("suspicious", "pua", "packer")):
|
||
return Severity.MEDIUM.value, 30.0
|
||
if "suspicious" in tag_set:
|
||
return Severity.MEDIUM.value, 30.0
|
||
return Severity.LOW.value, 10.0
|